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Abstract
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Today, 370 million people live in cities in earthquake 
prone areas and 310 million in cities with high 
probability of tropical cyclones. By 2050, these numbers 
are likely to more than double. Mortality risk therefore 
is highly concentrated in many of the world’s cities and 
economic risk even more so. This paper discusses what 
sets hazard risk in urban areas apart, provides estimates 
of valuation of hazard risk, and discusses implications 
This paper—a product of the Finance, Economics, and Urban Development Department and the Environment and Energy 
Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to examine the economics of hazard 
risks in urban areas. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at slall1@worldbank.org and udeichmann@worldbank.org. 
for individual mitigation and public policy. The main 
conclusions are that urban agglomeration economies 
change the cost-benefit calculation of hazard mitigation, 
that good hazard management is first and foremost good 
general urban management, and that the public sector 
must perform better in generating and disseminating 
credible information on hazard risk in cities.  1
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1. Introduction 
How can public policy help manage risks from natural hazards in urban areas? The focus 
of this paper is on ex-ante preventive measures. People and firms are attracted to cities to 
benefit from economies of scale and agglomeration, reflected in higher wages and 
productivity. Institutions that govern the use and transfer of land facilitate higher 
economic densities and influence development in hazardous locations. Ensuring that 
urban public services are adequate and infrastructure well maintained can generate 
welfare gains to the local population while reducing their risk from day to day hazards. 
Large scale investments designed specifically for disaster mitigation need to consider 
economic efficiency as well as distributional effects. While institutional weakness and 
land market distortions may lead to the development of informal settlements in hazardous 
locations, disaster risk reduction strategies should not end up being disruptive for the 
livelihoods of poor people. What is required is a combination of carrots, such as 
improved plots in safer areas with affordable transport that links distant locations to jobs, 
and sticks, including enforcement of land use and zoning to discourage the spread of 
informal developments in risky locations.  
The paper is organized in three sections. First, we discuss why a separate treatment of 
urban disaster risk is warranted (section 2). We argue that the benefits of economic 
density come with a higher concentration of people and assets at risk from natural 
hazards. And we discuss how geographic concentration changes the range of options and 
priorities for dealing with natural hazard risk – both for individuals and for public policy. 
In section 3, we provide an overview of existing empirical work as well as new findings 
to highlight how hazard risk is valued by firms and households. Our main finding is that 
if land markets work well, information on the location of natural hazards is priced into 
rents or home prices. However, many poor people are attracted by lower land prices in 
hazard prone locations thereby increasing the vulnerability of the poor. We then discuss 
appropriate policy priorities to mitigate disaster risk in cities in section 4. The challenges 
in developing countries are exacerbated due to (a) large scale informality in land markets 
where poor people locate in slums that are close to hazard sources; (b) rent controls that 
reduce private incentives to invest in mitigation; and (c) limited coverage of basic public   3
services such as sewers and drains that amplify the negative impacts of small scale 
hazards. Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions. 
2. Why disaster risk management in cities is different 
 
Why treat urban disaster risk separately from disaster risk in general? Many of the 
concepts and lessons relevant to disaster risk reduction apply generally—in rural, peri-
urban and urban areas. But some issues are specific to cities. Most importantly, as they 
increase in size, more and more people and assets will be exposed to natural hazards in 
dense urban areas. This density, of people and economic activity, not only changes the 
risk equation, it can also change the economics of disaster risk reduction strategies.  This 
section summarizes what is special about disaster risk in cities. It then discusses the 
lessons learned from the ‘new economic geography’ literature—also reflected in the 
World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report—in the context of natural hazards. 
Disaster risk in cities is large and increasing  
Global disaster damage statistics are not classified by urban versus rural location. We 
therefore have no concrete empirical evidence whether natural disasters have more severe 
impacts in urban compared to rural areas. This will depend on factors such as a country’s 
overall urbanization rate, the type of natural disaster studied and the measure of damage 
considered.  A drought or flood in a rural area may cause less direct damage than an 
urban earthquake or hurricane, but may have equally severe consequences on people’s 
livelihoods.  In the following paragraphs we discuss specific characteristics of hazard risk 
in urban areas.  A core message is that in a rapidly urbanizing developing world, the 
growth of population and economic assets in cities will lead to a rapidly increasing 
concentration of hazard risk in urban areas.  
Geography 
The interplay of economic and physical geography is one major reason for high hazard 
risk in urban areas. Many cities have historically emerged at a location with good   4
accessibility or favorable natural endowments such as a river crossing, a coastal location 
or fertile volcanic soils. Those geographic settings are often associated with an increased 
probability of hazard events—floods, cyclones and volcanoes. Agriculture in most of 
southern Italy, for example, is difficult due to poor soil quality. An exception is the area 
around Mount Vesuvius near the city of Naples where rich volcanic soils have been 
farmed for centuries despite the risk of new eruptions.  Globally an estimated 9 percent of 
population lives within 100 km of a historically active volcano, with high concentrations 
in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines) and Central America (Small and Naumann 
2001).  Similarly, low elevation coastal zones, often exposed to cyclones and storm 
surges, cover 2 percent of the world’s land area but contain 10 percent of the world’s 
population and 13 percent of the world’s urban population (McGranahan et al. 2007). 
Land scarcity 
Competition for land in urban areas is intense. City managers often exacerbate land 
scarcity by restricting high density development as further discussed later in this paper. 
The desire to live close to jobs and amenities means that even marginal city areas such as 
floodplains or steep slopes will be settled—often, though not always, by poor people.  In 
Santo Domingo’s largest slum, 45 percent of houses near a river flood when it rains (Fay 
et al. 2001, 2003). Housing prices reflect this risk with the poorest living in the lowest 
quality housing in the most at-risk areas. In cities such as Caracas or Rio de Janeiro, poor 
families occupy steeply sloped land prone to landslides.  This sorting process, with low 
income households and squatters occupying the most hazardous urban land is not static.  
Detailed data for Cali, Colombia, show that localized hotspots of small scale disaster 
events change as inner-city neighborhoods gentrify, governments improve hazard 
management, and new informal settlements spring up at the periphery (ISDR 2009).  
Externalities  
Land scarcity leads to higher land prices and therefore, usually, to higher density 
occupation. Larger building sizes in cities can increase damages and loss of life in severe 
earthquakes especially where building codes are not enforced. The collapse of larger 
buildings in dense urban areas may also cause neighboring buildings to be damaged even   5
if they are built to code.
2 These spillovers or externalities are absent in more sparsely 
populated rural areas where damages to smaller sized and dispersed dwellings will cause 
less or no collateral damage.  
Exposure 
The main reason why urban risk is large and increasing is the rise in exposure. Although 
urbanization statistics suffer from a lack of standard definitions of what should be 
considered ‘urban’, the assumption of half the world’s population living in cities seems 
realistic.  Urban populations are growing in practically all developing countries.  About 
40-60 percent of this growth can be attributed to natural growth, i.e., fertility of urban 
dwellers (Montgomery 2009).  The remaining growth is due to urban expansion and 
migration, reducing the share of rural residents except where rural fertility is vastly 
larger.  
The latest UN urban population estimates suggest that, globally, urban population 
exceeded rural population for the first time in 2008 (UN 2008).  In less developed 
regions, this threshold is expected to be reached by 2019.  This continuing urbanization 
process will lead to an increase of exposure of people and economic activity in hazard 
prone urban areas. Although we can only speculate about the global distribution of 
disaster damage in cities today and in the future, newly available geographically 
referenced data yield some estimates of urban exposure to natural hazards. A recent 
global hazard analysis generated a comprehensive database of hazard events during 1975-
2007 from observed data and of event probabilities from geo-physical models (ISDR 
2009). We combined this hazard information with city-specific population projections 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that well-documented evidence for such externalities is quite scarce. Their importance 
is usually taken as given: “A building collapse may create externalities in the form of economic 
dislocations and other social costs in addition to the economic loss suffered by the owner. The owners may 
not have taken these consequences into account when evaluating specific mitigation measures. Consider the 
following example. A building toppling off its foundation after an earthquake could break a pipeline and 
cause a major fire, which would damage other homes that had not been affected by the earthquake in the 
first place. “Kuenreuther and Roth (1998). See also 
www.quakesmart.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=92&Itemid=209. But some 
experiences have been documented: “As shown by research on the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 
including that conducted by the Architectural Institute of Japan, Architectural Institute of Japan (1997), 
houses with inferior earthquake-resistant quality triggered large negative externalities in the neighborhood. 
For example, broken fragile houses blocked transportation networks, thereby preventing effective fire 
fighting and, by severing lifelines, they made recovery more difficult.” (Nakagawaa et al. 2007).   6
prepared for this report for 1970 to 2050.  These population estimates are based on an 
economic-demographic model following Henderson and Wang (2007). Cities are 
included if their population exceeded 100,000 in a given year; there were about 3,700 
such cities in 2000, for instance. 
Overall, population in large cities exposed to cyclones is estimated to increase from 310 
to 680 million between 2000 and 2050.  These estimates assume that cyclone frequencies, 
severity and geographic distribution over this period will be similar to those between 
1975 and 2007. Climate change will likely affect sea surface temperature and other 
factors determining cyclone patterns, but the precise nature of these effects is still 
vigorously debated in the scientific literature. It is unlikely, however, that cyclone risk 
will decrease significantly and an expected shift in the distribution of cyclones should not 
change urban exposure pattern significantly.  As seismic activity is more stable over time, 
these caveats do not apply for earthquakes. Our estimates suggest that urban population 
exposed in areas with a significant probability of a major earthquake increases from 370 
million in 2000 to 870 million in 2050.  In both cases, this increase in urban hazard 
exposure is very likely not a net increase in urban exposure since some share of these 
additional urban residents will have come from rural areas exposed to the same or another 
hazard. In fact, increased hazard probabilities in coastal areas or drought risk may drive 
so-called environmental refugees into cities, possibly accelerating the concentration of 
disaster risk.
3 
The largest anticipated urban population exposed to cyclones is in South Asia where 246 
million residents of large cities are estimated to live in areas affected by severe storms by 
2050 (Figure 1).  OECD countries and the East Asia and Pacific region each will have 
about 160 million urban residents exposed to cyclones. South Asia also experiences the 
second largest growth in urban cyclone exposure between 2000 and 2050 at about 2.6 
percent per year, exceeded only by Sub-Saharan Africa’s 3.5 percent.  
                                                 
3 There is some evidence of relocation due to environmental pressures to which climate change may be 
contributing. See, for instance, Barrios et al. (2003), “Refugees Join List of Climate-Change Issues “ 
(www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/world/29refugees.html?_r=1) and “China at cross-roads” 
(www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/18/china-ecorefugees-farming).  What proportion of environmental 
refugees might relocate to hazard-prone cities cannot be easily determined.   7
Figure 1: Population in large cities exposed to cyclones increases from 310 to 680 million between 
2000 and 2050 (World Bank 2009) 
 
Exposure to earthquakes in urban areas is expected to be largest in East Asia and the 
Pacific at 267 million in 2050 from 83 million in 2000 (Figure 2). Exposure is also high 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (150 million in 2050) and OECD countries (129 
million in 2050).  The fastest growth of exposure to earthquakes is expected to occur in 
South Asia (3.5 percent) followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (2.7 percent). 
Figure 2: Population in large cities exposed to earthquakes increases from 370 to 870 million between 
















































What applies to population, applies even more to economic assets and output. Cities are 
engines of growth and firms prefer to locate in urban centers with good access to labor 
markets, complementary inputs and customers. Increasing returns and specialization raise 
productivity to levels not achievable in rural areas. Each unit of area therefore generates 
far greater output and hosts a larger stock of economic assets. Estimates of GDP for cities 
are not widely available, except for a few countries and some of the larger world cities. 
These suggest that urban output per capita tends to be several times higher than in rural 
areas.  This reflects the concentration and greater economic value of productive assets—
as well as public infrastructure and private assets such as homes—in cities.  Relative 
exposure of economic assets to natural hazards in cities will therefore be considerably 
higher than in rural areas. 
These dynamics have profound implications for urban disaster risk profiles. With climate 
change, event probabilities may increase for hydro-meteorological hazards. 
Vulnerability—the characteristics of exposed assets or people that make them more or 
less likely to be damaged by a hazard event—may also increase initially as fast urban 
growth leads to rising slum populations in sub-standard housing. But the main driver of 
hazard risk in urban areas today and over the next few decades will simply be the greater 
accumulation of exposure, likely exceeding the contribution of climate change (e.g., 
ISDR 2009). 
But some factors may reduce urban risk 
In contrast to these factors that might increase risk, urban areas also have characteristics 
that mitigate possible hazard impacts. First, urbanization tends to be associated with 
increasing incomes and better education. These generally reduce damages from hazards 
(Kahn 2005, ISDR 2009). Loss of life is much lower in rich countries. Economic 
damages tend to be larger, but when measured as a share of exposed wealth, they are 
smaller than in poor countries. With higher incomes, better quality housing can be built, 
mitigation measures are more affordable and better institutions lead to enforcement of 
rules and regulations aimed at reducing vulnerability.  Secondly, there are scale 
economies in risk mitigation.  For example, risk control measures benefit more people,   9
enforcement of standards is cheaper, and the cost of first responder services is shared by a 
larger population. 
Economies of scale and agglomeration change the way people and firms respond to 
natural hazard risk 
The defining characteristic of cities is the concentration of people and economic assets in 
a relatively small space.  Globally, a conservative estimate of economic concentration or 
density suggests that half of worldwide GDP is produced in just 1.5 percent of the 
world’s land, almost all of it in cities (World Bank 2008 /WDR09). This area is home to 
about a sixth of the world’s population. The economic landscape in Japan shows tall 
mountains around Tokyo and Osaka (Figure 3). In fact, Tokyo -- the largest city in the 
world with 35 million people – has a quarter of Japan’s population, packed into less than 
4 percent of its land.  
Figure 3: High economic densities around Tokyo and Osaka (GDP per sq. km) 
 
Source: World Development Report (2009) - Reshaping Economic Geography 
   10
When cities function efficiently, they attract firms in industries and services that value 
agglomeration economies. In fact, agglomeration economies are the reason that cities 
exist (Duranton and Puga, 2004).  They can occur within a given sector, when firms in 
the same industry concentrate in a metropolitan area to enjoy access to specialized 
suppliers or expertise that could not be supported with lesser concentrations.  Or they can 
occur across industries, as when firms from different industries benefit from collocating 
because the diversity of their skills and experiences encourages innovation.  
Agglomeration economies can be in consumption as well as production, as large cities 
attract residents because of the wider variety of restaurants, museums and other forms of 
entertainment.  Empirical research confirms that agglomeration economies are 
substantial.  Studies show, for example, that average productivity increases by 4 to 20 
percent with each doubling of metropolitan population, and that the productivity effects 
are particularly pronounced in certain industries, among them some services (Rosenthal 
and Strange, 2004; Graham, 2006). 
Agglomeration economies change how households and firms respond to natural hazard 
risk. People are unlikely to stay away from cities and urban residents do not tend to move 
out even when faced with significant hazard risk.  If cities deliver economies of scale and 
agglomeration, the stakes of being physically close to economic density will be high 
enough for people not to be deterred by hazard risk.  Risk mitigation (e.g., retrofitting 
buildings) and risk transfer (e.g., insurance) will be the main responses to risk.  
Mitigation is likely to have a positive benefit-cost ratio, and will be the mainstay of 
efforts in countries with weak information. In the longer term, as credible information on 
risk becomes available, the large market will be attractive for risk pooling through 
insurance. 
But if cities are inefficient—either due to weak institutions or bad policies—the 
economic gains from agglomeration will be low, making these locations less attractive to 
households and business owners. In those cases, growth may slow down further in cities 
facing risk from natural hazards. Data from global cities with more than 100,000 people 
suggests that population growth between 1960 and 2000 is slower in low income country 
cities at risk from earthquakes—middle income and high income country cities do not   11
exhibit any statistical change in growth rates (Figure 4). Similar patterns are found for 
landslide risk.  
Figure 4: Is population growth slower in "risky" cities? 
 
Data Source: Dilley et al. (2005)  
In fact, land use regulations that try to manage city sizes and urban form often end up 
hurting the urban economy by artificially raising prices of land, and pushing many poor 
people to live in locations at risk from environmental hazards. Regulation of development 
densities is the main instrument used by city planners to manage city development. Cities 
try to achieve lower densities in several ways. One approach is imposing building-height 
limits. These limits are imposed via a restriction on a structure’s floor-area ratio (FAR), 
which equals the total floor area in the building divided by the lot size. For example, a 
four-story building that covers half the lot area has an FAR of 2.0. A limit on FAR 
prevents the developer from constructing a tall building. Throughout the world, zoning 
regulations usually specify maximum FAR values in different parts of a city. But these 
FAR limits typically do not represent severe constraints on development, as they often 
roughly match the developer’s preferred FAR value in a given location. In effect, FAR 
restrictions often “follow the market,” providing a way for city planners to ensure that the 
character of development does not greatly diverge from the norm in a given area.  
However, in Mumbai planners went against the grain of markets. FARs were introduced 
in 1964 and set at 4.5.  Rather than raising the allowable density over time to 
accommodate urban growth, planners in Mumbai went the other way lowering the index 
to 1.3 in 1991.  These regulations hold Mumbai’s buildings to only between a fifth and a 
tenth of the number of floors allowed in major cities in other countries. The city’s 
topography should exhibit a high-density pattern similar to that in Hong Kong, China, but   12
it is instead mostly a low-rise city. Space consumption averages 4 m
2 – one-third the level 
in Shanghai and less than one-fifth of that in Moscow.  People still keep coming to 
Mumbai, but face skyrocketing housing prices and rapid slum formation.  
Evidence from developed and developing countries show that land use regulations 
designed to manage city size and guide urban form often end up hurting economic 
fortunes of towns and cities. By getting in the way of the urban area’s capacity to 
accommodate people and firms, place-specific regulations can lower productivity and 
artificially increase the price of urban land and housing services. And by increasing the 
scarcity of land (and housing) in the formal sector, these regulations encourage informal 
development—often in locations at risk from natural hazards. 
3. The valuation and distribution of disaster risk in cities 
 
Valuation 
Evidence from empirical research is ambiguous about the extent to which natural disaster 
risk is priced into property values. Much of the empirical evidence is based on estimation 
of hedonic models, where land and housing prices reflect the value of a property’s 
physical characteristics (such as size), as well as the characteristics of its neighborhood 
and the services and amenities available in the area (Lancaster 1966; Rosen 1974). The 
idea that the present value of a property is the sum of benefits derived from it is formally 
described as capitalization. These models have been used extensively to study variation 
in housing prices and location decisions. For example, the bid-rent models of Alonso 
(1964), Muth (1969) and others were based on the observation that land values decline 
with distance from (monocentric) city centers, as the cost of commuting increases, and 
that this variation is reflected in the price of housing. Similarly, one can examine how the 
value of land or a property changes (decreases) in locations that are at risk from natural 
disasters.  
Information on the location and source of risk should be capitalized in home prices. In 
Istanbul property values in 2000 were found to be lower near the fault lines in the Sea of 
Marmara compared to those further away (Onder et al. 2004). In contrast, proximity to   13
the fault line had no impact on property values when data from 1995 were used for the 
analysis. Presumably, information on distance from fault lines influenced property values 
as households became more conscious of hazard risk only after the Kocaeli earthquake in 
1999.   
Similarly in the United States, flood zone disclosure is mandatory in some areas of North 
Carolina, so buyers are aware of flood risk before buying a property. Using a hedonic 
property price model, Bin et al. (2008) find that the property market reflects geographic 
differentials in flood risk, reducing property values on average by 7.3%. The market 
capitalizes risk as flood insurance premiums equal the discount in property values. Bin 
and Polasky (2004) also examine the effect on property values in North Carolina of 
Hurricane Floyd (September 1999), which affected two million people and damaged 
property worth 6 billion dollars. Most properties did not have flood insurance before the 
hurricane but the event increased the awareness of flood hazards and houses located on 
the floodplain faced a price reduction from 4% to 12%. However, price reductions were 
greater than the capitalized value of insurance premiums suggesting the existence of non-
insurable costs associated with flooding.
4  
There are two common concerns regarding conventional hedonic approaches discussed 
earlier.  The first concern regards the imposition of a functional form, which can result in 
specification bias. The fact that theory does not suggest specific functional forms for 
outcome equations suggests that imposing one may require strong assumptions.  The 
second issue is that conventional regression identification strategies often compare apples 
to oranges, as there is considerable heterogeneity in the underlying variables used in the 
analysis. To address these problems, we utilize a micro level database of 800,000 
buildings in the city of Bogotá to examine if hazard risk was reflected in land values.  
For our analysis we match properties (without using functional form restrictions) on a 
range of characteristics based on available data. These include quality of construction, 
use of property (residential, commercial or industrial), and distance from the city center. 
In principle, the only difference among matched properties is their level of hazard risk. 
                                                 
4 The reduction of the property values on average was $7,460 and the increase in premiums for flood 
insurance was $6,880.   14
Our main interest is in identifying if property values in riskier areas are lower, thereby 
capitalizing “dis-amenities” from potential risk. We consider two approaches for 
comparing property prices. First, we group properties into deciles of seismic risk, and 
compare prices for matched properties in two adjacent deciles. For example, comparable 
properties in the riskiest decile are valued 7114 pesos less than properties in the next 
riskiest decile (see comparisons between the 9
th and 10
th decile in Table 1). Similarly we 
see lower property values in locations with higher risk for most deciles of seismic risk.  
Table 1: Propensity score matching results 
10th decile: most  risky neighborhoods. 1st decile: least risky neighborhoods 
Propensity Score 
Values   Treated    Controls  
 Difference 
in property 
values   Standard Errors  
9th vs. 10th decile 
      
107,864.21  
              
114,981.45  
      
(7,117.24) 
                     
438.65  
8th vs. 9th decile 
      
123,985.18  
              
124,605.55  
         
(620.37) 
                     
292.96  
7th vs. 8th decile 
      
135,456.52  
              
183,383.70  
    
(47,927.18) 
                     
561.85  
6th vs. 7th decile 
      
183,383.70  
              
177,011.83  
       
6,371.87  
                     
683.37  
5th vs. 6th decile 
      
194,592.08  
              
207,884.16  
    
(13,292.08) 
                     
755.68  
4th vs. 5th decile 
      
207,884.16  
              
189,487.95  
     
18,396.21  
                     
663.00  
3rd vs. 4th decile 
      
193,627.91  
              
234,565.17  
    
(40,937.26) 
                  
2,166.93  
2nd vs. 3rd decile 
      
232,855.67  
              
188,860.65  
     
43,995.02  
                  
2,043.64  
1st vs. 2nd decile 
      
188,860.65  
              
193,513.79  
      
(4,653.14) 
                     
454.74  
Source: estimates for this paper. 
Second, we identify ten neighborhoods facing the highest seismic risk, and examine if 
property prices are significantly higher in locations that are further away (Figure 5 shows 
where these neighborhoods are located). These include La Picota Oriental, San Juan 
Bautista and La Arbolada Sur. Estimates in Table 2 confirm that difference between 
properties in the riskiest neighborhoods and others locations increase with distance. For 
instance, property values per unit of construction are higher by 13,434 pesos in locations 
closest to the riskiest neighborhoods, and the difference increases to 28,265 pesos for 
locations in the 20
th-204
th percentile of distance. For the furthest 20 percentile, the   15
difference is 124,533 pesos. Details on the econometric work can be found in Atuesta et 
al. (forthcoming). 
Table 2: Property prices are lower in locations with high earthquake risk: Bogotá 
Treatment group: 10 most risky neighborhoods. Quintiles calculated based on distance to these 
neighborhoods. 
Comparison group   Treated    Controls    Difference  
 Standard 
Errors  
1st quintile vs. 10 risky neighb. 
      
101,684.48  
              
115,118.53  
     
(13,434.06) 
                   
818.11  
2nd quintile vs. 10 risky neighb. 
      
101,684.48  
              
129,949.62  
     
(28,265.14) 
                   
917.95  
3rd quintile vs 10 risky neighb. 
      
101,684.48  
              
128,633.04  
     
(26,948.56) 
                
1,027.02  
4th quintile vs 10 risky neighb. 
      
101,684.48  
              
192,346.51  
     
(90,662.03) 
                   
893.52  
5th quintile vs 10 risky neighb. 
      
101,684.48  
              
226,237.97  
   
(124,553.49) 
                
1,120.82  
Source: estimates for this paper. 
 
Figure 5: Neighborhoods at highest risk from earthquakes: Bogotá 
 
Data Source: Cadastre, Bogotá   16
Investors actively trade-off disaster risk with gains from economic density. In addition to 
the city or location specific analysis, we examine how investors value risk from natural 
disasters. Data from a recently compiled dataset of a sample of global cities provides 
some insights. Gomez-Ibañez and Ruiz Nuñez (2006) constructed a dataset of central 
business district office rents for 155 cities around the world in 2005 to identify cities 
where rents seem elevated or depressed by poor land use or infrastructure policies. Their 
dataset also includes information on many factors that determine the supply and demand 
for central office space such as construction wage rates, steel and cement prices, 
geographic constraints, metropolitan populations and incomes.  
We link this information to the natural disasters hotspot dataset (Dilley et al. 2005), and 
examine if city demand – as reflected in office rents, is sensitive to risk from natural 
disasters. Gomez-Ibañez and Ruiz Nuñez (2006) focus on offices in the primary business 
district, which they define as the district having the highest density of employment; a 
very large, if not the largest, concentration of offices; and the highest rents in the 
metropolitan area. As we are interested in the tradeoff between economic density and 
disaster risk, using the central business district works well for our analysis.   17
Table 3: Natural Hazards and City Demand 
 
Dependent variable (log rent) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Vacancy rates (2007) -0.0291*** -0.0284*** -0.0273*** -0.0320*** -0.0309*** -0.0319***
(urban demand) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban density (logs) 0.193*** 0.478*** 0.477*** 0.470*** 0.484*** 0.473***
(agglomeration) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Urban Population (logs) 0.066 0.128** 0.193*** 0.211*** 0.223*** 0.215***
(scale effects) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
 Construction wages (logs) 0.339*** 0.251*** 0.256*** 0.277*** 0.261***
(developer costs) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Average low temperature -0.0129*** -0.0128*** -0.0123*** -0.0127***
(geography) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pollution concentration -0.00244 -0.00236 -0.00217 -0.00231
(environment disamenity) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
City in earthquake zone -0.322*** -0.256
(hazard var) (0.09) (0.18)
City earthquake severity -0.0596*** -0.0152
(hazard var) (0.02) (0.04)
Constant 4.657*** 1.855 2.692* 2.747* 2.302 2.636*
(0.48) (1.61) (1.55) (1.47) (1.49) (1.50)
Observations 122 119 119 119 119 119
R-squared 0.304 0.513 0.57 0.616 0.61 0.617
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses  
Source: Estimates produced for this paper 
Estimates from regression analysis of office rents are presented in Table 3. These 
estimates should be considered as indicators of correlation—not precise magnitudes of 
causal relationships. The first three columns report results of estimating how office rents 
reflect city demand and supply. Vacancy rates have a negative effect, reflecting lower 
city demand, while urban density has a positive effect – reflecting economies of 
agglomeration. Construction wages have a positive effect on rents as construction labor 
accounts for about half the non-land costs of constructing an office building. 
Surprisingly, pollution concentration is not associated with office rents. 
In column 4, a variable on earthquake risk (whether the city is in an earthquake zone) is 
introduced into the regression. We find that being in an earthquake zone has a negative 
effect on office building rents – reflecting lower demand for a city. Similarly, earthquake 
severity (column 5) also has a negative effect on city demand. These estimates suggest 
that business owners trade off agglomeration economies with seismic risk in making   18
investment choices across cities. Similar regressions for floods and cyclones did not 
generate statistically significant estimates.  
Private investment in mitigation is capitalized into property values. Just as natural 
disaster risk reduces property values, investments in mitigation such as earthquake 
proofing structures are likely to be recovered through increases in property prices. 
Nakagawa et al. (2007) use a 1998 hazard map of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area to 
examine the extent to which housing rents reflect earthquake risk as well as earthquake-
resistant materials used in construction. The study exploits the fact that the Building 
Standard Law was amended in 1981 to enhance the earthquake-resistant quality of 
buildings, and that a building constructed after 1981 needed to conform to the new 
standard of earthquake-resistant quality. The authors find that the rent of houses built 
prior to 1981 is discounted more substantially in risky areas than that of houses built after 
1981. In Tehran, Willis and Asgary (1997) interview real estate agents to examine the 
capitalization of investments in Earthquake Risk Reduction Measures (ERRMs) on 
property values and assess if home buyers are willing to pay for ERRMs incorporated 
into a house. The estimates suggest significant price differences between earthquake-
resistant and nonresistant houses, across all districts in the city – however, the limited 
adoption of ERMMs in Tehran may be due to limited public information of earthquake 
risks. 
 
Spatial distribution of hazard risk 
There is heterogeneity in how households respond to information on risk. When facing 
risk from natural disasters, people can move out of harm’s way; they can self-protect by 
building structures less vulnerable to damage; or they can insure. Empirical research on 
how people and housing markets responded to Hurricane Andrew -- one of the largest 
natural disasters to affect the United States, shows that the economic capacity of 
households explains most the differences in how different groups respond to the 
hurricane damage (Kerry Smith et al. 2006). In 2000, households with annual incomes 
over USD 150,000 were the only group likely to be attracted to areas with a comparable 
“type” of household—i.e. to areas where the same income level households lived in 1990.   19
As property prices in the worst affected areas reduced the most, low income households 
responded by moving into low-rent housing being offered in these locations. On the other 
hand, middle income households moved away to avoid risk, and the wealthy, for whom 
insurance and self-protection was the most affordable, did not change where they lived. 
Poor people “sort” into low rent locations – which are often at higher risk to natural 
hazards. The problem is particularly acute in developing countries where there is a divide 
between the formal and informal markets for land. While formal developments may 
respect land use regulations, informal settlements are often located in hazard prone 
locations, such as on hill slopes, close to river banks, or near open drains and sewers. In 
Dhaka for example, informal settlements are developing across the metropolitan area, 
with many residents lacking basic public services and in locations at risk from flooding. 
In fact, most informal settlements do not have access to a public toilet within 100 meters, 
and 7,600 households in 44 slums live within 50m of the river (World Bank 2005, Dhaka 
Urban Poverty Assessment). 
For the city of Bogotá, we use the same database discussed earlier to examine if poor 
people are at greater risk from natural hazards – particularly earthquakes.  By collecting 
data on the location of properties, income levels of households, and linking this to 
information on hazard risk, we find evidence that poor people face disproportionately 
high burden of hazard risk, as they sort into high density low rent properties, which are 
located in higher risk locations. Figure 6 shows the distribution of seismic risk on the left 
panel and residential location of the poor households in Bogotá.
5 In comparison, Figure 7 
shows the spatial distribution of the richest twenty percent of the city’s households. From 
these maps, it becomes clear that poor households are located in areas with higher 
earthquake risk, which are towards the western and southern parts of the city. On average 
the city’s poor live in locations that have twice the seismic risk compared to where rich 
households live.  
 
                                                 
5 We include households who fall in the lowest twenty percentile of the city’s income distribution.    20
Figure 6:  Bogotá -- poor people face higher risk from earthquakes 
 
Figure 7:  Bogotá – rich people sort in lower risk locations 
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Source: Cadastre data from the city of Bogotá 
Our empirical analysis highlights that households and businesses value the dis-amentiy of 
natural hazard risk in deciding where to locate as reflected in a negative capitalization of 
hazard risk in property values. We find that earthquake risk has a negative association 
with land values. We also examined if people living in areas at risk from natural hazards 
(earthquakes, landslides, and floods) invested in improving building quality when they 
were close to centers of economic activity. The underlying intuition is that the net 
benefits from investing in mitigation have a higher pay-off when the value of assets at 
risk is higher. To examine this hypothesis, we examined the spatial patterns of 
investments in structural upgrades and compliance with building standards among low 
income residents. Regression analysis shows that compliance with building codes is 
higher and quality of construction better in dwellings close to the city’s economic center. 
This is indicative that individual investment in mitigation increases with economic 
density as people have more to lose with disruptions due to natural hazard events.  
Residents of informal settlements trade-off housing services and environmental safety 
to be physically integrated in the labor market. Evidence from Pune, India tells us that 
poor households prefer to live close to their work place – thus, living in centrally located 
slums allows slum dwellers to access jobs. Many of these slums are located on riverbanks 
that are prone to flooding or on hillsides. These residents are also willing to pay a 
premium to live in areas that are composed of households sharing their language, 
religion, level of educational attainment and average length of tenure in the neighborhood 
– community structure and social capital are very important. An assessment of the 
welfare impact of relocating slum dwellers from their current locations to less desirable 
peripheral locations shows that relative to no intervention (allowing slum dwellers to be 
in their current location, with the same service levels and housing conditions), upgrading 
services in situ is the only policy intervention examined which increases welfare of these 
slum dwellers. Moving to alternate locations is welfare reducing – showing that slum 
dwellers are willing to put up with the threat of poor housing and environmental 
conditions to be physically integrated in the labor market (Lall et al. 2008).    22
The challenges of informal development in hazardous locations get severe when local 
governments do not have the administrative capacity to enforce land use codes or monitor 
the development of new settlements. In Dakar, for example, the fastest population growth 
in the metropolitan region over the last 20 years happened in peri-urban expansion areas 
and 40% of the population growth in these peri-urban areas occurred on high-risk lands, a 
percentage that almost doubled that in rural and urban areas (Figure 8).
6 The physical 
vulnerability and risk in peri-urban areas are compounded by weak institutional capacity 
than in traditionally urban or rural areas. 
Figure 8: Weak administrative capacity and increasing hazard risk in peri-urban areas: Case of 
Dakar 
 
Source: Wang and Montoliu (2009) 
 
Why are peri-urban areas more vulnerable? Human settlements in peri-urban areas in 
developing countries are exposed to greater risks due to the following factors: (a) 
settlements are often unplanned due to lack of planning standards and land-use plans; (b)  
lack adequate infrastructure; (c) weak property rights; (d). located in precarious areas; 
and (e) weak institutional structures at the local level. However, as illustrated by the case 
of Dakar, peri-urban areas are one of the fastest growing areas as they provide cheap and 
readily available land for settlement. In fact, Pelling (2003) argues that the peripheries of 
expanding cities tend to grow more rapidly compared to central business districts. In 
                                                 
6 Satellite data were used to map: (a) the pace and direction of growth of the metropolitan area of Dakar 
over the past 20 years into the surrounding rural areas; (b) potential disaster hotspots resulting from models 
predicting the impact of selected types of disaster (e.g. flood, coastal surge/erosion); and (c) population 
density and the nature of build tissue in the metropolitan region and beyond, to distinguish dense urban 
from peri-urban and rural growth. 
Hot-spots of social vulnerability 
since 1988
Hot-spot of population 
increase in high risk zones 
Population growth in areas with low or
no hazard potential
Population growth in areas with
high/moderate hazard potential

















   23
mega-cities, annual growth rates of peripheral population tend to reach around 10-20 
percent compared to central business districts.   
4. Implications for public policy 
 
Hazard management is a task both for the public sector and for private households 
and firms. 
For the public sector in cities, this includes ensuring the safety of municipal buildings and 
public urban infrastructure, encouraging and supporting private sector hazard risk 
reduction, and developing first response capacity. A considerable share of hazard risk 
stems from relatively small but frequent events which cause localized damage and few 
injuries or deaths (Bull-Kamanga et al. 2003). For instance, an analysis of detailed 
records of 126 thousand hazard events in Latin America showed that more than 99 
percent of reported events caused less than 50 deaths or 500 destroyed houses (ISDR 
2009). In aggregate, these accounted for 16.3 percent of total hazard related mortality and 
51.3 percent of housing damage.  The probability of larger events may or may not be 
predictable. For instance, a city may be in an earthquake risk zone, but the location 
specific ground shaking probabilities are not known. Individual dwelling unit level 
mitigation is therefore necessary everywhere in the general area of high earthquake 
probability. For other hazard types like landslides and floods, potential risk areas can be 
more easily delineated. Households in the risk zone have limited options for protecting 
against these hazards individually. But some form of large, collective risk mitigation is 
sometimes feasible, such as levees or slope stabilization measures. The following 
paragraphs discuss the role of public policies in supporting individual versus collective 
hazard risk reduction.  
Good urban management goes a long way towards reducing urban hazard risk, 
especially the small-scale, under-the-radar-screen events. 
Natural disasters are the man-made consequences of geo-physical hazard events. This 
applies for large as much as for small-scale hazards. But smaller disasters can be more 
easily avoided.  Good routine urban management already reduces disaster risk   24
considerably. By mainstreaming hazard risk reduction in everyday urban planning and 
management, negative consequences can be avoided early on. For instance, floods in 
developing country cities are often the consequence of insufficient maintenance of 
drainage systems. In South Asia, monsoon rains encounter drainage ditches that are used 
as garbage dumps, losing their function to transport runoff away from settlements. For 
example, Mumbai spends about 1 billion rupees ($25 million) per year on preparing for 
the monsoon rains. Yet, the 2005 monsoon caused 300 deaths.
7 Unchecked urban 
development that leaves too little porous green space further increases runoff and flood 
risk.  
Besides hazard-proofing urban infrastructure investments and improving service 
provision such as garbage collection, land use planning is another core task of city 
government that has an influence on hazard risk. For hazard risk reduction the main 
objective is to prevent development of hazard prone land. In fast growing cities land for 
new development is scarce.  Poor people often cannot afford transport charges and need 
to locate close to city centers to have access to labor markets. They often end up on the 
least desirable land such as flood plains or steep and unstable slopes. To reduce 
settlement of these areas cities need to use a combination of regulation and incentives. 
Zoning enforcement must attempt to prevent settlement of the most risky areas. This is 
not easy since informal settlements can spring up overnight and once established are 
difficult to relocate.
8  To absorb a growing population while excluding risk-prone areas, 
cities need to ensure a supply of suitable land for new development. As these areas will 
be further from economic opportunities, land development must be accompanied by 
affordable transport services.  
These problems are not easily addressed. However, there are several cities that have 
started to institutionalize disaster risk within their local policies. Table 4 provides a 
snapshot of policies from Bogotá, Metro Manila, Istanbul and Seoul. It is clear that there 
is no single template for disaster risk management. Table 4 illustrates that there are 
different models of disaster risk management and the experience varies across countries. 
                                                 
7 http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUKBOM301508._CH_.242020080528 
8 To prevent settlement of steep lands in Bogotá, the city government establishes communal facilities in 
those areas such as public parks or cemeteries. Local residents then help prevent settlement as they benefit 
from these amenities. (Francis Ghesquieres – pers.comm.).   25
It is evident that a key ingredient is the existence of strong institutional capacity at the 
local level. 
In any case, most developing country cities are severely resource and capacity 
constrained, and they face a backlog of public investment while dealing with continued 
population growth in part through an influx of new residents. Yet, these cities will invest 
billions of dollars over the next years in public infrastructure and services as many of 
them will double in size over the next three decades. Mainstreaming risk reduction in 
urban planning and management will help reduce risk and at a lower cost compared to 
ex-post mitigation.   26
Table 4: Experiences of selected cities on Disaster Risk Management (Source: http://www.emi-megacities.org/megaknow) 




Legislation for Disaster 
Risk Management 
(DRM) 
Key elements of Disaster Risk 
Management (DRM) 
Stakeholder Involvement  Experience 
Bogotá, 
Colombia 
20 localities  Established in 1987. 
DRM is governed by the 
District System for 
Emergency Prevention 
and Attention (SPDAE).  
 
- A national plan for prevention 
and attention of disasters has been 
prepared which was incorporated 
in the territorial and land-use plans 
(POT) for Bogotá Metropolitan 
area in 1998. 
- In 1995, a resettlement plan was 
been initiated for informal 
settlements residing in high-risk 
zones to relocate households to 
safer areas. 
Strategic alliances between 
institutions, academia and 
private enterprises 
The city has made 
concerted efforts to 
ensure households 
avoid locating in 
precarious areas. 
However, efforts are 







N/A  Since 1999, legal reforms 
in the country provided 
metropolitan cities greater 
jurisdictional authority 
over land and buildings.  
-Metropolitan Municipality of 
Istanbul established AKOM, a 24/7 
state of the art disaster 
coordination system. 
-Municipalities increased authority 
over building construction 
supervision and compulsory 
earthquake insurance laws 
N/A Bureaucracy,  weak 
enforcement of norms 
and standards and 









Metro Manila Disaster 
Coordinating Council. All 
LGUs have their own 
Disaster Coordinating 
Councils. 
-Each LGU prepares its own 
comprehensive land use plan 
which is submitted to Housing and 
Land use Regulation Board for 
ratification. 











- Requires existing building to be 
tested against seismic activity 
based on earthquake resistant 
design standards from 1999 to 
2005. 
2001 action plan involving 
Seoul Red Cross and 
incorporates a public-private 
partnership for local 
earthquake management plan 
N/A   27
For individual-level risk reduction, a core task for cities is to provide the information 
for land, housing and insurance markets to operate efficiently. 
Consider the city government’s role in supporting these activities. A core task of the 
urban public sector is simply to coordinate the production and wide dissemination of 
credible information on disaster risk. Such information is often produced by private firms 
as well, but selective disclosure creates information asymmetries that put households at a 
disadvantage. Data on hazard probabilities and vulnerability of structures and people feed 
into comprehensive risk assessments. These should be considered a public good, 
accessible to all.
 9 Such information then allows residents to make informed location 
choices, enables markets to price hazard risk appropriately, provides the basis for the 
emergence of private insurance markets, and it serves as a sound basis for transparent 
zoning decisions and other land use restrictions. 
Disaster risk varies across space, so information on hazard event probabilities, exposure 
and vulnerability needs to be collected and disseminated spatially. New technologies, 
such as satellite images with a resolution high enough to replace far more expensive air 
photos and global positioning systems that facilitate field data collection, have made it 
easier and cheaper to collect geographic data.  Easy-to-use geographic data browsers 
(such as Google Earth) make spatial data available to everyone. Most importantly, while 
hazard mapping has been performed for many decades, new technologies allow constant 
updating of information at relatively low cost. Making these technologies accessible to 
cities—not only the largest, but also smaller and medium sized cities with limited local 
capacity—should be a priority for national governments and donors. 
For large-scale collective hazard risk reduction investments, the costs and benefits 
depend in large part on the dynamics of the urban economy. 
The above portfolio is something cities should do to support risk reduction. The decision 
to invest in larger protective infrastructure is more complex. For instance, if parts of a 
city are at risk of flooding from river overflows or storm surges, large scale infrastructure 
                                                 
9 Robert J. Murnane, “New Directions in Catastrophe Risk Models”, Baseline Management, October 9, 
2007. Risk modeling companies typically use proprietary models and require non-disclosure agreements 
with licensees.    28
investments in dams or levees can reduce that risk. Such investments raise several 
important questions. 
Do the benefits justify the costs? Investments in large scale infrastructure compete with 
other demands for scarce resources in developing country cities. The cost-benefit 
calculation largely depends on the value of land. In dynamically growing cities, where 
land is scarce, large scale investments to make land habitable or reduce significant risk 
may well be justified. An analogy is large-scale land reclamation in cities such as Hong 
Kong, China; Singapore; or around the urban core of the Netherlands. Limited alternative 
expansion options in the vicinity of high economic density raise the value of land 
significantly. This shifts the cost-benefit ratio in favor of large protective investments. A 
strict test is whether a developer would, in principle, be willing to pay a price for the 
reclaimed or protected land that reflects the cost of the intervention. 
The viability of large scale disaster mitigation infrastructure will be very different in 
cities with a stagnant economy and little or no population growth. Today this is largely a 
phenomenon of mature economies with demographic decline or strong geographic shifts 
in economic and population centers (Pallagst 2008). Examples are the former socialist 
countries in Europe but also parts of Scandinavia and the Mediterranean countries, as 
well as the old industrial core of the US Midwest. Over time, given demographic trends 
in many middle income countries, “shrinking cities” may also emerge in some of today’s 
emerging economies, for instance in East Asia.  
The best known example in a natural disaster context is New Orleans. Public investments 
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina have sparked a vigorous debate on the role of large 
scale protective investments to encourage the rebuilding of New Orleans within the pre-
Katrina city limits. It is estimated that $200 billion of federal money will be used to 
rebuild the city. Some have argued for providing residents of areas behind massive flood 
control infrastructure with checks or vouchers, and let them make their own decisions 
about how to spend that money—including the decision about where to locate, or relocate 
(Glaeser 2005). The choice is between spending $100 billion dollars on infrastructure for 
city residents vs. giving each residents a check for more than $200,000 – in a place where 
annual per capita income is less than $20,000. From an urban economics perspective, it   29
may therefore not be the best use of scarce funds to invest in rebuilding large scale 
protective infrastructure in New Orleans, a city in decline that reached its peak of 
economic importance in 1840.
10 
What are the distributional impacts? Large scale protective infrastructure will turn 
undesirable land—often the only space available for the poor—into coveted real estate. 
Development of this land may well displace poor residents who will have no place to go 
but other risk-prone parts of a city or places that are far from economic opportunity. 
These displacements need to be anticipated by requiring set-asides for low income 
households, designing proper compensation mechanisms, socially responsible 
resettlement schemes, or alternative housing options with good accessibility to jobs and 
services. Planning protective infrastructure must therefore be embedded in broader urban 
development planning. The costs of mitigating distributional impacts need to be 
considered in the overall cost benefit analysis. This may shift the balance in favor of 
more traditional risk reduction strategies such as early warning or mitigation at the 
individual level. 
Will the investment be climate-proof? Engineering designs for hazard resistant structures 
typically follow a risk based approach. For instance, according to the American Society 
of Civil engineers, in the United States major dams are designed so that the probability of 
a failure causing more than a thousand fatalities is less than once every 100,000 to 1 
million years. Estimating these risks is difficult especially where the geophysical baseline 
information is limited. Furthermore, the level of risk may not be static. With climate 
change, flood or storm surge return periods may shorten considerably during the life span 
of long-lived infrastructure. What was once a 1 in 500 year event (or a one in ten chance 
every 50 years), may become a 1 in 200 year event. Making structures climate resilient 
requires designs with a high margin of safety. Storm surge protection in the Netherlands 
is designed to withstand events with a 10,000 year return period. This increases costs 
significantly. But the alternative is to face higher than expected risks after protective 
investments have encouraged people and firms to move into harm’s way.  
                                                 
10 The Civil War and the relative decline of water-based transportation relative to rail caused the city to lose 
ground, relative to Northern cities, through much of the Nineteenth century. New Orleans’ population 
peaked at 627,000 residents in 1960 and began to decline following Hurricane Betsy in 1965 to 485,000 
residents in 2000. (Glaeser 2005).   30
Do alternative mitigation strategies exist? Some hazard risk is made more severe by 
human interference in natural systems in the vicinity of urban areas. Increased urban 
flooding—for instance in South and Southeast Asia—is often attributed to deforestation 
in upper watersheds. But many scientists believe that the conversion of wetlands to urban 
use has contributed significantly to more frequent floods (Bonell and Bruiinzeel 2004). 
Draining wetlands reduces the absorption capacity of soils, removing the natural buffer 
function of these areas. Restoring the ability of the land to regulate water flow may often 
be a more cost effective risk reduction strategy with additional ecological benefits. 
Large scale protective infrastructure may sometimes be justified on economic grounds 
where land is scarce and valuable, financial resources are available, no lower cost options 
exist and environmental impacts can be minimized. But, as the discussion in the previous 
paragraphs showed, the bar should be set fairly high. 
How public policy can encourage individual level risk mitigation 
 
How can public policies help in reducing hazard risk while not disrupting livelihoods of 
the urban poor? Building capacity in local planning institutions will help limit 
development in hazard prone areas. But these preventive measures are unlikely to work 
by themselves. Rather, public policies should try to encourage private investment in 
hazard risk mitigation without imposing severe constraints on livelihood strategies of 
residents. Three policies can be of particular relevance here. 
Deregulating land markets: In many countries, excessive land regulations have led to 
shortages in formal land supply in safe areas and driven up prices, making it difficult for 
many households to enter the formal land market. As discussed earlier, the most 
pernicious and frequently used land use regulations are restrictions on building heights, 
which result in highly restrictive markets that lead to inefficient use of land as well as 
adverse equity consequences. These restrictions increase the geographic size of a city; 
raise the cost of housing in the city, and price poor people out of the formal land and 
housing market. This leaves informal and often hazard-prone areas as their only option 
close to economic opportunities.   31
A second land-use intervention is the regulation of development densities, which 
similarly reduces housing supply on suitable land. One approach is a minimum lot-size 
restriction, which limits densities in areas with detached houses by requiring that each 
structure be surrounded by an ample land area. In 1979 the Federal government in Brazil 
established the basic legislation at the national level (Federal Law 6766) for developing, 
approving and registering urban land subdivisions. Among these parameters were a 
minimum lot size of 125 m², with a minimum frontage of 5 m, and a compulsory 
donation of 35% of development area for public uses and open spaces.
11 This effectively 
zoned many poor people out of the formal land and housing market. 
Property rights. The literature on property rights provides three primary justifications for 
titling (Brasselle et al., 2002).  First, the “assurance effect”, argues that a title will provide 
households with secure tenure, and thus households will be more likely to invest in their 
dwelling once the fear that others will benefit from their improvements by seizing their 
property has been reduced (Jimenez, 1984; Brasselle et al., 2002).  Second, the 
“collateralization effect” argues that a title will provide a household with the ability to 
use one’s property as collateral, and thus provide households with easier access to credit 
markets (Feder et al., 1988; Besley, 1995; Feder and Nishio, 1999; De Soto, 2000; 
Brasselle et al., 2002).   Third, the “realizability effect” argues that being given a title will 
lower the transaction costs of transferring one’s property to others (Besley, 1995; 
Brasselle et al., 2002). Overall, households will be more willing to invest in 
improvements, including hazard mitigation, if they are assured to reap the long term 
benefits while living in their dwelling and through increased home values. 
Titling programs however face numerous institutional constraints. These include limited 
down marketing of general and housing specific finance. Lenders are unwilling to 
provide loans as most residents of informal settlements also work in the informal sector 
and do not have regular incomes, which make it difficult to assess their repayment 
capacity. Further, property titles are often disputed, which makes it difficult to use them 
as collateral. In addition to institutional constraints, the demand for titling may vary 
                                                 
11 Lall, Wang and DaMata (2007)   32
across households and individuals, as the better educated and better informed may see the 
intrinsic value of having a property title for economic investments. 
In the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, the government has implemented slum 
regularization programs where slum dwellers have been provided with titles, called 
pattas. On average, slum dwellers with titles spend about twice as much on home 
maintenance and upgrading housing quality compared to other slum dwellers (Lall et al. 
2006). In addition to the influence of tenure security on private investment, property 
rights are likely to be associated with a higher degree of community participation (Lall et 
al. 2004). Tenure security provides incentives for individuals to invest in the community 
because the gains from improvements in services can be capitalized in the value of the 
home.  Slum households with titles are more likely to participate in community based 
service provision—37.5% of the survey respondents with titles participate in community 
service provision, compared to 28.9% for households without titles. Similarly, in 
Ecuador, Lanjouw and Levy (2001) show that households with a stronger claim to their 
property are significantly more likely to participate in activities to improve the 
community. 
Why is risk often not priced into home values and mitigation often not done?
12 
As discussed in preceding sections, the evidence from hedonic analysis of risk mitigation 
in housing markets is mixed. There is some evidence that known hazard risk and 
vulnerable building quality lower housing prices. Yet, even in high-risk cities and 
neighborhoods, mitigation efforts are often scarce.
13 Economic and behavioral reasons 
provide some possible explanations.  
                                                 
12 The discussion of the principal-agent problem and possible solutions to it is based on Adhvaryu and 
Deichmann (2009). 
13 Dr. Richard Sharpe (Earthquake Engineering New Zealand) reported on work in Istanbul. Many areas 
with highest potential ground acceleration in the likely event of a future earthquake are occupied by five-
floor apartment buildings.  Inspection of a sample of these buildings suggests that most would not be able 
to withstand a major earthquake (51% were at high risk, 28% at very high risk). Building collapse will 
likely lead to high mortality. Yet, structural retrofitting of these buildings is extremely rare at costs of 
external retrofitting solutions of 19% of reconstruction costs. (R. Sharpe, Presentation at the World Bank, 
22 September 2008.).   33
Limited mitigation in private buildings may be related to housing ownership in cities. In 
rural areas, most people live in dwelling units owned by the household. The person 
responsible for the strength of the structure is also the person bearing the consequences if 
the structure fails.  In urban areas, many apartment buildings are owned by landlords who 
do not live in them, so the person responsible for the structural integrity of the building is 
not at major risk to be injured or killed when the structure collapses.  The relationship 
between landlords and tenants of residential buildings in urban areas exhibits the 
properties of the well-known principal-agent (PA) problem in information economics. 
Not only are the objective functions of the two parties different from each other, but their 
information sets are likely very different as well. Below, we examine how these 
differences may contribute to the lack of retrofitting of urban residential buildings in 
developing countries, followed by a discussion of possible policies to increase private 
mitigation.  
Since landlords often live away from the buildings they own, their incentives to retrofit 
are different from the incentives of their tenants. For the landlord, the consequences of 
poor construction or lack of retrofitting are related primarily to infrastructure damage. 
The potential cost of human life, or destruction of tenants' property, may not be 
incorporated fully in the landlord's investment decision when he does not live in the 
residential structure himself and when—as is common in developing countries—there is 
little likelihood of criminal prosecution for negligence in construction or maintenance. 
Traditional cost-benefit analysis for retrofitting investment, which does not incorporate 
the expected loss of tenants' lives, show that potential building damages alone are 
typically not sufficient to justify investment on the part of building owners (Ghesquiere et 
al. 2006).  
The expectation of government aid in the event of a natural disaster further dampens the 
perceived benefits of retrofitting for the landlord (OECD 2004). Also, studies have shown 
that house owners may be making decisions based not on an expected utility model but 
rather using simplified heuristics that do not fully incorporate the probability of disaster, 
even when it is perfectly observed (Kunreuther and Kleffner 1992). Finally, there is often 
a high level of mistrust between home owners and contractors, who may provide sub-  34
standard building services. Without independent assessment whether the retrofitting 
solution is adequate and cost-effective, landlords may not want to risk scarce capital. 
 Further, in many urban areas of developing countries, building code regulation and 
enforcement is inadequate, if they exist at all. This lack of regulation, often combined 
with widespread corruption, diminish the potential legal consequences for the landlord, 
while making it harder for tenants to pursue legal action. Disasters are often seen as “acts 
of God,” and only gross negligence is prosecuted; in countries where legal institutions are 
weak, prosecution in any instance may not be feasible (Jain 2005). 
On the other hand, the benefits from retrofitting may be high for tenants, since retrofitting 
enables them to avoid loss of life and destruction of property. Why do tenants then not 
directly finance, or otherwise initiate, retrofitting in their places of residence? There are 
several possible answers to this question. The simplest explanation is that individuals are 
not fully aware of hazard risk which is a function both of the probability of a hazard 
event such as an earthquake and the vulnerability of their dwelling units. This risk can 
vary significantly even within a given neighborhood of an earthquake-prone city 
(Nakagawa et al. 2007). In addition to this concern, the behavioral economics literature 
shows that especially for the case of very low-probability events like large-scale 
earthquakes, probabilities are often not accurately assessed, and that individuals adhere to 
a “selective fatalism,” choosing often to downscale the importance or likelihood of events 
over which they perceive having little or no control (Sunstein 1998). Thus, the costs of a 
disastrous earthquake may not be accurately perceived and incorporated as a result of this 
selective reckoning of risk. 
Since the benefit of infrastructure investment for risk mitigation is likely to accrue 
benefits only in the long term on average, individuals' subjective discount rates over time 
also play a potentially important role in evaluating the costs and benefits of such 
investment (Kenny 2009). Recent research from development economics (Oster 2005, 
2009) implies that because of the multitude of risks often faced by individuals in 
resource-poor countries, discount rates are likely to be higher than in the developed 
world, thus creating a high opportunity cost of investments that yield payoffs only in the 
long-run or not at all.   35
But even where the risk is generally known, there are a number of possible reasons for 
tenants’ complacency. First, financial constraints, including low liquidity and low access 
to credit, can be significant barriers to investment. Access to credit is particularly low 
where owner-residents or landlords have only de facto, not de jure tenancy such that they 
cannot use their dwelling as collateral. Second, tenants often do not have the legal 
authority to make changes to their building's structure. Third, appropriate retrofitting 
procedures involve structural changes to the entire residential structure, not to individual 
apartments.  Anbarci et al. (2005), for example, have shown that collective action 
problems like the decision of a building's tenants to invest in retrofitting technology are 
exacerbated by inequality: heterogeneous agents bargaining for collective action may not 
be able to agree on an adequate distribution of costs, inducing a non-cooperative 
equilibrium in which each individual self-insures or does not insure at all (depending on 
the income level).  
Policy options to increase private mitigation efforts 
Strengthening building codes and effective enforcement have reduced the number of 
vulnerable dwelling units in countries such as Japan or the United States. Interestingly, 
high insurance coverage—typically absent in low income countries—can reduce the 
incentives to implement loss reduction measures (Kunreuther and Kleffner 1992). 
Insurance covers the loss of property, but earthquakes and other hazards can also cause 
high mortality. Governments therefore frequently mandate the implementation of cost 
effective mitigation; insurance premiums should then reflect the lower risk. But in 
environments with weak institutions and enforcement, regulation by itself is not 
sufficient. 
Policy intervention is aimed at aligning the objectives of tenants and landlords, and 
expanding and generating overlap of information sets across the two parties. Under the 
PA framework, policies toward a solution to the problem of retrofitting differ in the 
degree of government intervention in markets and incentives. We begin with the least 
interventionist policy, which is information disclosure. Disaster risk is often imperfectly 
observed and incorporated into cost-benefit analyses by both tenants and landlords; 
information campaigns must therefore be directed towards both parties. This information   36
has two components: hazard probability and building vulnerability. First, tenants must be 
made aware of the risks of living in buildings close to active fault lines and on vulnerable 
soils. This requires investment in geological surveys and seismic monitoring technology 
and dissemination of the resulting information as a public good. Secondly, and more 
complicated, is the assessment of building quality. This requires an engineering 
assessment of each structure. This is costly, so the question is whether the landlord or the 
government should cover the cost. A compromise is where an initial public engineering 
inspection yields a simple vulnerability score. If the score is below a certain threshold, 
the building owner is required to obtain a more thorough inspection that proves the 
buildings integrity.
14 
Adequate hazard risk information would increase awareness of the probability of disaster, 
as well as potentially mitigate the problem of selective fatalism discussed earlier by 
enabling tenants to realize that the choice of residential housing can mitigate the extent of 
earthquake risk they face. Since price is often the most easily processed signal of 
underlying quality, public disclosure of idiosyncratic earthquake risk could also generate 
a rental market with an informative price gradient (Brookshire et al. 1985). 
Providing information to landlords may boost the chances of retrofitting, as well. 
Landlords may revise their cost-benefit calculations based on more precise probabilities 
of earthquake risk. However, if the revised (accurate) probability does not change the 
outcome of this calculation, the public disclosure of the fact that building owners decide 
to build in relatively high-risk areas or that they do not retrofit buildings in those areas 
appropriately, could spur the development of a social cost on such negligence in the form 
of public shaming. This added cost further boosts the probability of undertaking 
appropriate disaster mitigation investments. Such strategies have been implemented 
successfully in the control of industrial pollution through public disclosure of emission 
levels of firms using a simple rating system (Wheeler 2000). The driving forces behind 
these efforts have been national environmental agencies as well as non-governmental 
organizations. 
                                                 
14 New Zealand, a country with high seismic activity, uses this approach.   37
The previous discussion applies where the information sets of both landlord and tenant 
are limited. Another important source of inefficiency through PA interaction is 
informational asymmetry. In particular, it is plausible that landlords have more 
information than their tenants about the extent of disaster risk and of the safety of their 
buildings' construction. Landlords have no incentive to reveal this information to tenants, 
since even landlords who own marginally risky buildings do not stand to benefit from 
alerting potential tenants.  
Policy intervention in this case should be aimed at reducing the extent of asymmetry by 
making the same information available to both parties. One idea along these lines is to 
introduce monitoring agreements into rental contracts, although the effectiveness of such 
agreements would need to be proven in practice. Information on how dangerous a 
particular building is, both in its location and its construction can be made available to 
potential tenants through such agreements, enabling them to judge the extent of 
retrofitting or sound construction accurately. Mandating such agreements would exert 
pressure on landlords, through the market mechanism, to engage in retrofitting 
investment. The cost of monitoring—hiring trained engineers to survey and test the 
construction of buildings—can be borne by some combination of the government, 
landlords, and tenants.  
The final strategy we discuss is direct support to landlords to engage in retrofitting 
investment, for instance in the form of subsidized credit or tax breaks, or direct penalties 
for not doing so. This policy involves significantly more government intervention than 
public disclosure mandates or information campaigns. Policymaking in this arena can 
benefit from a large literature in economics that discusses optimal contracting methods 
for different types of principal-agent interaction. For example, Hiriart and Martimort 
(2006) show that in the context of regulation of environmentally risky firms, mandating 
an extension of liability for environmental risk to stakeholders (principals) in 
endogenously formed contracts can be welfare-improving for both parties. The concept of 
extended liability could potentially be brought over to the landlord-tenant relationship in 
the disaster mitigation case: if landlords were held liable for the mortality consequences 
of earthquake disasters that affect their tenants, their cost-benefit calculations would 
likely change dramatically.    38
Laffont (1994) similarly advocates the use of optimal contracts for regulation based on 
the particular type of PA problem. Of interest are contracts that include auctioning of 
incentives to landlords (which would make for efficient use of government funds), and 
optimal dynamic contracting under limited commitment, under which the specified 
contract changes as the landlords investment actions are revealed from period to period. 
Finally, Gawande and Bohara (2005), who examine law enforcement of oil spills 
involving US flag tank vessels, find that the optimal contract is a mixture of ex ante 
incentives and ex post penalties. This carrot-and-stick brand of contracting could be 
beneficial in the disaster mitigation case as well. Giving landlords monetary incentives to 
retrofit, and threatening penalties in the case they have not, could be an effective 
combination.  
Using incentives or penalties to align retrofitting objectives may be most appropriate for 
the construction of new urban residential buildings, and may prove important, given that 
the urban population in developing countries is expected to grow dramatically in the next 
quarter century. The demand for new residential buildings in urban areas is likely to be 
directly proportional to this population growth, and so the opportunity to intervene before 
construction is ripe. Some form of direct support during this period, paired with public 
disclosure agreements of the sort discussed above, could provide significant monetary 
and non-pecuniary incentives to landlords to construct buildings capable of withstanding 
the earthquake risks they face. As with all types of subsidies for hazard risk reduction, 
however, these need to be carefully designed to avoid moral hazard that can reduce 
incentives for autonomous risk reduction efforts or encourage building in areas of clearly 
delineated high risk—as is often the case with subsidized risk transfer such as flood 
insurance. 
Urban public finance implications 
Financing local infrastructure and public services is challenging in most developing 
country cities. In addition, planning for and financing infrastructure to reduce 
vulnerability to hazards that may only affect certain parts of a city become particularly 
challenging as user charges are often not adequate for cost recovery. From an efficiency 
perspective, a simple, yet often forgotten economic principle—the Henry George   39
Theorem, named after a 19th century American political economist and activist—can be 
used to help cities finance public goods and infrastructure. The basic Henry George 
principle: city governments should implement a land-value tax that provides the incentive 
to develop land to its highest value and enhance economic density. 
The success of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in becoming major commercial 
centers is in large part because much of their public finance is based on taxing land 
values (Peterson 2008).  Hong Kong’s revenues came mainly from selling land leases, 
with low taxes on trade and commerce. Johannesburg and Sydney have levied real estate 
taxes on land values only.  Some cities in Pennsylvania have had a two-rate system, 
where land values are taxed at a rate higher than the tax on improvements.  Property 
taxation is widely used in developed countries (it represents up to 30% of local revenues 
in European countries). Ad valorem property tax on residential and business property is a 
neutral tax that would provide incentives for cities to accept new residents, as well as 
help finance urban services. The tax on business property will cause firms to consider 
more carefully the opportunities for economy in land and space utilization. It will also 
align more closely the services provided to commercial and industrial property with the 
costs of providing these services. 
The higher the economic density, the easier it should be for taxes to be raised to finance 
infrastructure and public services.  However, political economy considerations have 
limited the extent to which cities have been able to implement land based taxes. 
Politicians dislike property taxes and let valuable land be bought and sold without paying 
taxes; land bought for speculation is left idle; income taxes are paid to the central 
government but very few cities use piggy back systems to tap into this source (Peterson 
and Annez 2007).   
Provided that cash-flows are stable and predictable, cities can leverage their own taxes 
and access credit sources to finance infrastructure.  Municipal Bonds are used to finance 
local capital expenditures in a number of cities, especially in the US and Canada. They 
allow city residents to raise revenues for lumpy investments, while still facing the costs 
of the capital assets they acquire.  The success of municipal bonds depends on the 
discipline of the local authorities. Bondholders must be paid as their claims come due,   40
and if cities fail to do so (the raiding of the bond accounts) national governments may 
feel compelled to make good on the bonds.  This problem has plagued local finance in 
Latin America and explains the relatively underdeveloped local credit markets in 
countries such as Brazil and Mexico.  
It is unusual that smaller cities issue their own bonds, but they can join forces with other 
cities through specific funds and shared operations.  Municipal Development Funds in 
place in many countries (e.g. India, South Africa, and Brazil) have been very useful to 
provide credit to intermediate cities and help leverage their own budget resources.  
Another option to “unlock” urban land values—is by selling public lands to capture the 
gains in value created by investment in infrastructure projects (Peterson 2008). Land-
based financing techniques are playing an increasingly important role in financing urban 
infrastructure in developing countries. They complement other capital financing 
approaches, such as local government borrowing, and can provide price signals that make 
the urban land market more efficient.  
There are at least two important challenges in designing instruments to finance 
infrastructure specifically designed to reduce natural hazard risk. First, paying back debt 
raised to finance long term and lumpy investments for hazard mitigation may take 
resources away from routine maintenance and basic service delivery, introducing a 
development–disaster mitigation tradeoff. The problem is exacerbated when information 
on the location and frequency of hazards is not accurately known – and resources may 
end up being spent on unproductive activities.  
Second, who should bear the burden of paying for hazard mitigation infrastructure – 
owners of capital who have assets at risk, or households who worry about loss of limb or 
life? And should localities directly in harm’s way foot most of the bill, or should financial 
instruments also tap neighboring localities which are likely to experience beneficial 
spillovers? Answers to these questions are not straightforward. Assessments of the 
distributional impacts of hazard risk – across groups or people or neighboring 
jurisdictions are scarce in developing countries. Distributional concerns are likely to 
emerge if financing instruments do not differentiate between land uses and location 
specific (dis)amenities.    41
 
5. Summary  
 
Exposure to natural hazard risk in urban areas is large and increasing, largely driven 
by economic opportunities in cities. 
The population in large cities exposed to cyclones is estimated to rise from 310 to 680 
million between 2000 and 2050. And the urban population exposed in areas with 
significant probability of major earthquakes will increase from 370 million to 870 million 
over the same time period.
15 Even in the most hazard-prone cities, disaster risk is unlikely 
to reduce population growth, because the economic premium due to agglomeration 
economies and the amenity value of large cities dominate the location decisions of firms 
and people (World Bank 2008). Public policies aimed at slowing down the growth of 
hazard-prone cities are unlikely to succeed. On the other hand, reducing urban hazard risk 
through large scale mitigation infrastructure must carefully consider the dynamics of city 
demand. Building large protective infrastructure may make sense in rapidly urbanizing 
places that are attracting skilled workers and private investment, where land is scarce, 
and fiscal capacity is sufficient. They may not be justified where they protect stagnant or 
declining areas, as some have suggested is the case in New Orleans (Glaeser 2005). This 
applies to ex-ante investments as much as to the decision to rebuild. Sometimes, rather 
than “build back better”
16 the preferred strategy is “better build elsewhere.” 
 
The cope-mitigate-transfer framework of risk management also applies to different 
types and sizes of cities in a country’s urban system. 
 
All cities are not equal.  We expect that city characteristics will influence the nature of 
response to disaster risk. So the priority policies will also be different for “successful”, 
large and rapidly growing cities compared to smaller towns and cities in lagging regions.  
                                                 
15 No estimates are currently available for flood risk. Global hazard distributions data focus on large rural 
floods, while a large share of flood damage in cities comes from localized floods often caused by 
inadequate drainage infrastructure.  
16 See, e.g., Kennedy et al. 2008.   42
 
Table 5: Typology of cities 
 Cope/  Move  Mitigate  Insure 
Advanced Urbanizers 
“Superstars”  X     
Secondary cities / 




Market towns /incipient 
urbanization    
X  
(does not justify costs)  X 
 
In the policy framework presented in Table 5, for the largest and most dynamic cities we 
expect that the benefits from agglomeration economies outweigh greater risk, especially 
when the probabilities are relatively small for any reasonable time period (as in the case 
of earthquake risk).  The stakes are too high for people to be deterred.  So people are 
unlikely to move or stay away.  As a result, moving to alternate locations in response to 
disaster risk is less likely, especially in developing countries with high primacy. Risk 
mitigation (e.g., retrofitting buildings) and risk transfer (e.g., insurance) will be the main 
responses.  Mitigation is likely to have a positive benefit-cost ratio, and will be the 
mainstay of efforts in countries with weak information. In the longer term,—as credible 
information on risk becomes available—the large market will be attractive for risk 
pooling through insurance. 
For secondary or intermediate cities, the options are a bit less clear. People are more 
likely to move to more dynamic cities or to invest in mitigation. But in many cases, the 
cost benefit analysis is unlikely to generate long term positive yields from mitigation 
efforts.  Insurance is less likely an option because information failures and the smaller 
city size mean that there is no transparent and large enough market.  
For smaller cities (market towns, incipient urbanizers), moving is the only available 
response to reduce risk.  Significant investment in mitigation is unlikely to be cost-
effective and insurance markets will not extend to the smallest towns. 
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Hazard risk reduction in cities requires, first and foremost, good general urban 
management. 
Hazard management in cities needs to be seen as an integral part of urban planning and 
management, not as a separate activity. Urban disasters are frequently the consequence of 
poor urban management. Three aspects are particularly important:  First, hazard proofing 
new urban infrastructure should be standard procedure, but is frequently ignored. This 
includes implementing structural engineering standards for public buildings, but also 
sizing of drainage systems for peak events, or developing steeply sloped land without 
increasing the probability of landslides.  
Second, maintenance of infrastructure and good basic service provision reduce the 
impacts of hazard events and prevent further indirect damages.
17 In most developing 
country cities, public services such as water, sanitation, sewerage, lighting, and health 
services are underprovided. Poor service delivery not only has adverse direct effects on 
household welfare, it can also convert everyday hazards into disasters (Bull-Kamanga et 
al. 2003). For instance, where drainage networks are poorly maintained, even moderate 
floods can cause deaths from waterborne diseases and cross contamination between water 
and sewer lines. Where roads on steep terrain are not kept in good condition, they can 
increase erosion and landslide risk. These “institutional” efforts of achieving minimum 
standards in service delivery should form the bedrock of hazard risk reduction strategies. 
Third, land use management, in particular zoning, needs to prevent settlement of the most 
hazardous areas. Poor people often bear a disproportionate burden of hazard risk because 
land scarcity forces them to “sort” into informal settlements or low rent dwellings in 
hazard prone areas such as flood plains or steeply sloped land. For instance, in New 
Orleans: “After [Hurricane] Betsy [in 1965] highlighted the differentials of flood risk, the 
middle classes moved away from the eastern part of the city and the lowest lying districts 
became increasingly unimproved rental properties - the preserve of low income and 
elderly residents.”
18 While enforcement of zoning laws may limit development in 
                                                 
17 The poor record on infrastructure maintenance has been highlighted by Estache and Fay 2007, among 
many others. At 4 percent of GDP, estimates of required maintenance expenditures equal those required for 
new infrastructure investment  
18 “Climate Change, Insurance and Development”, Presentation by Robert Muir-Wood of Risk 
Management Solutions, Inc., World Bank, December 3, 2008.   44
hazardous locations, it can cut poor people off from labor market opportunities by forcing 
them onto cheaper land far from the city center. Complementary demand side policies 
such as reforming land use regulations for higher density growth, rent vouchers or 
improving access to housing finance can help informal sector residents move into better 
quality dwellings. Investments in affordable transport integrate lower cost residential 
areas and expand a city’s economic reach—creating a larger integrated labor market. 
With good transport services, households do not need to locate in informal settlements in 
hazard-prone parts of the city. Local governments must develop the capacity to balance 
the need for flexible land use management with the enforcement of zoning and building 
standards. 
Collection and public disclosure of credible information on the source and location of 
hazards helps people and businesses make better choices on where to live and where to 
invest. 
Generating and disseminating hazard information is perhaps the least distortionary urban 
hazard management policy. Where credible information on the distribution of 
geophysical hazard risk and the vulnerability of structures exists, empirical evidence 
suggests that hazard risk is capitalized into prices for residential properties and office 
space. Informed residents can choose between risk transfer through insurance (where it is 
available), investing in mitigation in situ such as retrofitting houses to comply with 
building codes, or moving to less risky locations. Places close to economic density 
(within and across cities) will likely see market induced self discipline where individuals 
comply with building codes to lower physical harm and disruption in businesses from 
natural disasters. In places far from economic density, where land values are low, people 
are more likely to move towards lower risk locations. Credible and public information 
also provides a basis for the emergence of efficient private insurance markets—where 
risk assessments are generated by the insurer and not disclosed, information asymmetries 
put residents at a disadvantage.  Finally, public risk information serves as a sound basis 
for transparent and least distortionary zoning decisions and other land use restrictions. 
Unfortunately, encouraging data sharing, even when data generation was funded with 
public resources, is not a trivial task. Public agencies often see data as a strategic or   45
marketable asset rather than as a public good whose wide and inexpensive distribution 
increases overall welfare. 
Public policies should facilitate the development of market based instruments for better 
managing disaster risk, provide the right regulatory environment, and selectively 
intervene where clearly defined social and environmental externalities exist. Common 
institutions that allocate property rights, manage land use, monitor zoning compliance, 
and disseminate credible information on hazard risk are fundamental building blocks for 
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